 For at least a quarter of a century, US military strategists have calculated that if China moved aggressively against Washington’s allies in Asia — by imposing a naval blockade on Taiwan, or threatening Japan’s vital sea lanes — the US Navy could, as a last resort, weaponize oil against Beijing. Most of China’s seaborne oil imports flow through the Strait of Malacca, a narrow waterway that links the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Block that passage, the thinking went, and China’s economy would be crippled. The war in Iran has shattered those assumptions. Not only has China’s economy survived the oil supply disruption largely unscathed, but its enormous oil stockpiles, overland pipelines, new technologies to convert coal to chemicals, and embrace of green technologies have given Beijing strategic leverage. By contrast, the island economies around China, including Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines — all overwhelmingly reliant on imported energy — are struggling. The Trump administration, meanwhile, is facing the increasingly fraught economic and political fallout of rising inflation as a result of the energy shock. As long ago as 2003, former Chinese leader Hu Jintao raised concerns about what he called the “Malacca Dilemma,” revealing a deep insecurity that has been a key driver of Beijing’s industrial, military, and diplomatic strategy ever since. Indeed, the trillion-dollar Belt & Road Initiative is in large part a defensive maneuver, born of a desire to reduce China’s susceptibility to maritime threats from the US by looking inland to the vast Eurasia continent. Today, Beijing has transformed what was once a chronic vulnerability into a source of strength and begun to redraw the geopolitical map of its region. |