The Ebola outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo strain is spreading in one of the most volatile and underserved regions of the DR Congo, where conditions are ripe for the virus’ spread: Armed conflict, displacement, and irregular migration due to artisanal mining all combine. By the time Congolese authorities publicly confirmed cases on May 15, hundreds of suspected infections had accumulated, and there is no approved vaccine or treatment for this strain..
Having led responses to Ebola, urban plague, polio, and measles across Africa with USAID, I can say with confidence that what is unfolding in the DR Congo cannot be contained by a public health response alone.
USAID’s longstanding presence in communities — built over years of partnership with community health workers, agricultural extension agents, teachers, government officials, local leaders, and religious groups — meant that when an outbreak struck, we could mobilize quickly. We could counter disinformation before it took hold, activate surveillance networks already embedded in daily community life, and begin prevention and treatment activities simultaneously rather than sequentially.
What is conspicuously absent in the current response is this kind of integrated, multisectoral infrastructure. In the midst of an emergency, it’s impossible to snap a finger and stand up community-level networks, inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms, and trusted local relationships. These things must be cultivated in advance and carefully sustained over time.
DR Congo cannot afford a response defined by its narrowness. Local authorities and partners must immediately expand their Ebola response beyond the health sector, engaging community leaders, local government, education, agriculture, security, and humanitarian actors as equal partners in surveillance, prevention, and communication.
But identifying the problem is not enough. The international community must also commit to the structural reforms that will make the next response faster and more coordinated than this one.
As population growth drives animal-to-human disease transmission, outbreaks like the current one will become more frequent, requiring a sustained level of vigilance that cuts across sectors. Meeting that challenge demands permanent inter-governmental coordination units and not the current model of temporary structures standing down the moment a crisis ends. Such a response must be led by an entity with the authority to coordinate across sectors and the budgetary power to redeploy resources where they are most needed.
This crisis serves as a stark reminder that epidemic preparedness relies on more than just laboratories or clinical equipment; it requires deep-rooted institutions and relationships. When governments possess the architecture to coordinate a comprehensive action, pathogens can be checked. Without it, the disease will inevitably gain the upper hand.
The cost of a fragmented response is too steep for the challenge we confront. The moment to act is now.
Daniele Nyirandutiye is a senior fellow in the National Security and International Policy department of the Center for American Progress.