View / OPEC+ is managing sentiment, not oil supply

On Sunday, seven OPEC+ nations announced they would add 188,000 barrels a day to global supply, starting in June. But the Strait of Hormuz is still closed and some producers aren’t able to ship a single barrel.

The decision — reached during a video call between officials from Algeria, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Oman, Russia, and Saudi Arabia — was described as a commitment to “market stability.” What it actually demonstrates is the distance between the group’s political messaging and physical reality. Saudi Arabia’s new June quota is set at 10.291 million barrels a day; the kingdom actually produced around 7.79 million in March, and is exporting far less. Kuwait recorded zero crude exports in April 2026 — the first time that has happened since the 1991 Gulf War. The 188,000 bpd figure is a symbolic press release.

This matters because the number is being used to tell a story of imminent recovery. The reality is different. The road back to stable oil markets is longer and more technically treacherous than any government is willing to say, and the apparent confidence of some in Washington that a Hormuz reopening will quickly cool prices is not supported by a single credible industry estimate.

The strait has been closed for more than two months, severing roughly 20% of global oil supply. Hundreds of vessels are stranded inside the Gulf. Mine-clearing alone could take up to six months by US estimates.

Assume, generously, that the strait reopens next month. The oil still does not follow immediately. Production wells shut in for weeks cannot be ramped back too quickly without risking reservoir damage. An estimated 128 laden tankers carrying 160 million barrels must exit before empty vessels can enter and load. More than 40 energy infrastructure sites across nine countries have sustained severe damage from Iranian strikes. Meanwhile, every major importer that drew down its strategic reserves during the crisis will need to refill them — absorbing a significant share of early recovery volumes, muting price declines.

The mechanics argue against a fast drop in prices: Rystad Energy puts full market normalization at three-to-five months after reopening.

Then there is Iran. If a comprehensive deal is struck and sanctions on Tehran are eased, Iranian oil is likely to re-enter the market — a surge OPEC+ would be expected to absorb through fresh cuts. That is a painful ask of members who have already sacrificed months of revenue. If no deal is struck, the underlying instability remains. Either outcome complicates supply management and OPEC+ has no clean answer to either.

The alliance is also navigating this without the UAE. Abu Dhabi left OPEC+ on May 1, citing frustration with its production cap. It was the third-largest producer inside the bloc, pumping around 3.4 million barrels a day before the conflict — roughly 11% of OPEC’s total. More significantly, the UAE has committed to expanding its capacity to 5 million barrels a day by 2027 and is now free to pursue that without any quota restriction.

When Hormuz reopens, OPEC+ members will be desperate to compensate for lost revenue, but an unconstrained UAE will be maximizing its output too. The alliance was already struggling to hold members Iraq and Kazakhstan to their commitments. Saudi Arabia will once again face the choice of defending prices through its own cuts while rivals take its market share — and Riyadh’s patience for that arrangement has historically had limits.

The challenge for OPEC+ in 2026 is not just responding to market conditions, but absorbing the consequences of US policy decisions — which have been technically and financially damaging for Gulf producers. The longer wells stay shut in and export infrastructure sits idle, the longer the recovery will take. That equation does not appear to be factored into Washington’s projections.

Compounding this, Venezuela’s oil exports surpassed 1 million barrels a day in March 2026 for the first time in six months, and the Trump administration projects the South American country’s production could rise by a further 40% by the end of the year. That is additional unmanaged supply in a market OPEC+ is already struggling to calibrate.

OPEC+ meets again on June 7. By then, Hormuz may still be closed, the Iran situation unresolved, the UAE unconstrained, and Venezuelan barrels flowing outside any alliance discipline. The alliance will be gathering to discuss a market it no longer fully controls and may well announce further targets it still cannot meet.

Wael Mahdi is an independent commentator specializing in OPEC and Saudi Arabia’s economy, and co-author of “OPEC in a Shale Oil World: Where to Next?”